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Introduction
This paper compares the development of the G20 
with that of the G8. This exercise might be in-
formative to consider future scenarios for the G20. 
Our central question is whether the G20 is likely 
to undergo a similar evolution as the G8, giving 
the conspicuous parallels between their respec-
tive development until now and between the in-
ternational contexts in which this occurred. From 
this perspective, the paper will hopefully also con-
tribute to current debates on the relationship and 
division of labor between the G8 and G20. In the 
first section, a comparison is made between both 
groupings’ historical evolution. Subsequently, ma-
jor differences between the two bodies that could 
result in different pathways will be discussed. The 
final section will address the likelihood of alterna-
tive scenarios. 
Historical Parallels between  
the G8 and G20
The similarities between the historical evolutions of 
the G8 and G20 are too striking to be overlooked in 
a discussion on their respective future, and the fu-
ture of the newly upgraded G20 in particular. Given 
the parallels, one could even ask whether the emu-
lation of the G8 example by the G20 is stoppable 
at all. 
Both the G8 and G20 followed from a severe 
international financial and economic crisis [1]. 
The diplomatic format we know today as the G8, 
was born in the context of the crisis of the Bret-
ton Woods regime, the first oil shock and the sub-
sequent economic slowdown of the middle of the 
1970s. In fact, the G8 originated in a meeting of 
the finance ministers of the US, Germany, UK and 
France in 1973 – the so-called Library Group, to be 
joined in 1974 by Japan to form the “G5”. The first 
“G6” leaders’ summit (including Italy) took place 
in 1975 in Rambouillet. The group was joined in 
1976 by Canada to form the G7, in 1977 by the 
European Community and in 1998 by Russia to 
form the G8. Until now, the G7 continues to meet 
without Russia on certain financial-economic mat-
ters. The G20, in its turn, was created in 1999 in 
response to the Asian financial crisis and its global 
ramifications. Between 1999 and 2008 it gathered 
in its highest level configuration as a meeting of 
finance ministers and central bankers. So, both the 
G8 and G20 originated from monetary turbulence 
and financial crisis as indicators of deepening 
complex interdependence, or globalization, and 
the increased demand for international coopera-
tion the latter process entails. 
Both instances were accompanied by a com-
parable geopolitical context as well. In the 1970s, 
there was a sense among Western leaders that 
dealing with the crisis required high-level coopera-
tion among the states that mattered most at that 
time. Leaders felt that the US could not longer do it 
alone. In 1999, the G7 realized that in its turn it had 
become too small, and that the new rising powers 
had to be brought on board. In fact, the creation 
of the G8 and G20 reflected the ongoing process 
of deepening multipolarity. Between 1973–1975 
and 1999 the circle of countries that in the per-
ception of world leaders were needed to tackle the 
financial-economic crises had only expanded. By 
launching these bodies, leaders wanted to add a 
new layer of governance to the existing global insti-
tutional architecture, namely two flexible and infor-
mal mechanisms among the most powerful states 
for consultation, coordination of domestic policies, 
and giving the right impulses to official multilat-
eralism. They deemed these new fora, with their 
very specific diplomatic methods, necessary to 
manage a world characterized by both risk-prone 
globalization and multipolarity. In this respect, an 
interesting question to be asked is whether the 
creation of the G8 and G20 was evitable at all. Of 
course, their launch required the voluntary agency 
of certain individuals, who could even more influ-
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ence their exact composition and working meth-
ods. But anyhow, specific structural factors in 
world politics acted as highly permissive causes, 
ready to be picked up by entrepreneurial leaders. 
In this sense, even though the G8 and G20 remain 
controversial in terms of legitimacy (they are self-
appointed clubs trying to exert global leadership), 
they almost “had to” come into existence, whether 
we like that or not. 
Given the demand for international coopera-
tion in these specific contexts of global monetary 
or financial crisis and growing multipolarity, it is 
perhaps not a coincidence that both fora started 
at the level of finance ministers, to be elevated to 
leaders’ level at a later stage. In the case of the G8, 
as we saw, this happened quite quickly. For the 
G20, it took until the 2007–2009 global financial 
crisis to convene for the first time at the level of 
heads of state and government in Washington in 
November 2008. In September 2009 in Pittsburgh, 
the G20 designated itself as the premier forum for 
the members’ international economic cooperation 
and decided to convene as an annual summit from 
2011 onwards. 
The initiative to set-up a process of G8 sum-
mitry came from the French President Valéry Gis-
card d’Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt. Both were finance ministers at the time 
of the Library Group, and probably appreciated 
that process. The administration of US President 
Gerald Ford, who led a country traumatized by Vi-
etnam and Watergate, understood the new inter-
national context and agreed to the idea of a sum-
mit. The launch of the G20 at leaders’ level was 
equally a European initiative. The French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown went to see the US President George W. 
Bush in the final months of his term and convinced 
him of convening a summit. Interestingly, the idea 
to have a G20 at leaders’ level was already around 
for some time. A few years before the global crisis, 
the Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin (2004–
2005) was already campaigning for a “Leaders’ 
20” (L20), based on his positive experiences with 
the G20 at finance ministers’ level. Together with 
his American counterpart Lawrence Summers, 
Paul Martin is generally seen as the founder of the 
G20 in 1999. Given the wide series of global chal-
lenges and global political gridlocks, a few years 
later he found it necessary to elevate the existing 
G20 process to leaders’ level and extend its agen-
da beyond the financial and economic realm. So, 
what we see here is (former) finance ministers and 
non-US actors playing critical roles in moving for-
ward the process of major power concert. 
Since its inception, the G8 process has grad-
ually expanded its agenda. Started as a financial-
economic crisis committee, it now deals with issues 
such as security, development, energy, climate, 
and health. All this work is supported by an estab-
lished practice of functional ministerial meetings, 
apart from the meetings of the G7 finance minis-
ters. The actual contributions of the G8, often at a 
technocratic level far removed from the spotlights, 
is until now not fully appreciated by the world me-
dia and global public opinion. Agenda broadening 
is also at the order of the day within G20 summitry. 
Although it can be argued that these matters have 
some connection with financial and economic co-
operation, the G20 summit has already touched 
upon issues such as development, anticorruption, 
and marine environmental protection. In addition to 
the ongoing G20 finance ministerials, the group al-
ready held a meeting of the labor ministers in April 
2010.1 At present, it is an open question to what 
extent the G20’s agenda will expand the same way 
as the G8’s has done, which would almost auto-
matically entail the necessity of more ministerial 
meetings. 
Differences
At first glance, it seems that the G20 is a set to 
undergo a very similar evolution in the years ahead 
as the G8. The expansion of the G8 process was 
fuelled by both globalization and growing multipo-
larity. The latter two processes have only grown 
in intensity. In that scenario, the question is not 
whether the G20 will fully embark upon a generalist 
global governance agenda and preparatory min-
isterial meetings, but when. At the onset of G20 
summitry, many observers even depicted the G20 
prematurely as a kind of enlargement of the G8, 
with the latter to disappear soon. Yet, substantial 
differences between both bodies prevent the G20 
from simply copying the evolution of the G8. 
The G8 is closer to the notion of a “like-mind-
ed” group than the G20. From the start in 1975, 
the G6 underlined the members’ common identity: 
“We came together because of shared beliefs and 
shared responsibilities. We are each responsible 
for the government of an open, democratic soci-
ety, dedicated to individual liberty and social ad-
vancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is 
essential to, democratic societies everywhere. We 
1 In the course of 2010, two meetings of tourism min-
isters have taken place as well (the so-called T20), but their 
configuration did not fully correspond with the G20, while 
the G20 chair did not highlight it on its website. At best, for 
the time being this process occurs only peripherally to the 
G20.
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are each responsible for assuring the prosperity of 
a major industrial economy. The growth and stabil-
ity of our economies will help the entire industrial 
world and developing countries to prosper” [2]. 
The G20 will be unable to agree on a similar text in 
the foreseeable future. The G20 is much more het-
erogeneous economically, politically, and cultur-
ally. The larger number of the group makes things 
even more difficult. The more unwieldy character 
of the G20 decreases the appetite among certain 
members to engage in agenda broadening and the 
proliferation of G20 ministerials. It also leads to a 
more formal way of interaction, with more “written 
speeches” during meetings, and less opportunity 
for interpersonal “chemistry” among leaders and 
their top aides.
What is more, summitry through bodies such 
as G8 and G20 is predominantly a Western idea. 
For large developing countries such as China, In-
dia, Brazil and South Africa it is not self-evident to 
fully engage in these mechanisms. Being part of a 
future G20 as the apex body for global governance 
could alienate them from their G77 partners. More-
over, these countries feel more comfortable in of-
ficial multilateral environments such as the UN and 
WTO. There things tend to go slowly, and these 
countries can claim to be “developing countries” 
rather than “rising powers with commensurate re-
sponsibilities.” For the rising powers for which this 
is relevant, obtaining a permanent seat at the UN 
Security Council is a much more important goal 
than seeing the G20 develop into the central po-
litical steering committee for global governance. 
By the same token, emerging powers’ enthusiasm 
about the G8 “outreach” processes has always 
remained mixed. They were reluctant to buy the 
predominantly Western-driven agendas. As far as 
the G20 is concerned, after all its upgrade came 
after a global financial meltdown caused by mis-
management in the Western financial sectors. The 
crisis also inflicted damage to the emerging world, 
but banking systems there continued to do quite 
well. A lot of recent G20 work is basically directed 
at the Western countries. 
For all these reasons, the G20 agenda is not 
likely to expand analogous to the G8’s in the near 
future. Yet, these differences need to be put into 
perspective. The G8’s common identity (liberal-
democratic, pro-market) based on a long history 
among most members is a fact. But the G8 has al-
ready seen serious disagreement on a broad range 
of issues as well (e.g., Iraq war, fiscal stimulus ver-
sus consolidation, climate change). Relations be-
tween Russia and West countries are often under 
strain because of conflicting security and economic 
interests, and different views on international and 
domestic political issues. The G8 membership of 
Russia in a way reduces the identity gap between 
the G8 and G20, since the former is not longer 
to be a regarded as a “Western lobby” and has 
become more like a pluralist “concert”. The latter 
happens to be exactly what the G20 is all about. In 
other words, the remaining vitality of the G8 since 
Russia’s accession is good news for the G20; the 
necessity to cooperate helps to overcome the dif-
ficulties that pluralism entails. 
At the same time, within the G20 there is a 
growing potential for political convergence due to 
the exigencies of globalization. Common interests 
can flow from a common identity with common 
values, but also from common threats and chal-
lenges in a world of advanced complex interde-
pendence. Yet, there is little automaticity in this. 
Political elites still have to acknowledge the causal 
linkages between global issues and concrete do-
mestic problems, and regard stronger international 
engagement through the G20 as more beneficial to 
their national interests than isolationism or unilat-
eralism. Structural factors in the background can 
only facilitate the mental realization that closer co-
operation with other major powers is preferable, 
but they can be counterbalanced by other consid-
erations as well. 
By elevating the group to an annual summit 
at leaders’ level, a crucial hurdle has already been 
cleared. Skeptics of the G20 process should not 
underestimate the importance of this decision. 
From now onwards, the leaders of 19 major econ-
omies plus the EU (and possibly the representa-
tives of other well-established regional organiza-
tions) will gather each year around a certain global 
(economic) governance agenda. In most cases 
the process will be propelled by an enthusiastic 
chair. In the same way as the G8, G20 leaders will 
be scrutinized by the global public opinion, and 
thanks to the periodicity of the meetings, feel the 
pressure to deliver, to live up to their promises, 
and to be held accountable. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties the G20 encounters, the members, in-
cluding the big powers, have endorsed its con-
tinuation. If they really thought this to be threat to 
their national interests, the greater powers could 
have blocked it. Because of these indications, it 
is assumed in this paper that the G20 will further 
develop, be it very gradually, and not vanish with-
in a few years. The May 2010 National Security 
Strategy of the United States, for example, in a 
remarkable way recognizes the prominence of the 
G20, even though actual enthusiasm in Washing-
ton about the process is now at a lower level than 
it was at the time of the relatively successful April 
2009 London summit.  
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Moreover, agenda broadening within the G20 
is already well under way. The quite extensive No-
vember 2010 “Seoul consensus” on development, 
for example, cannot longer be considered as the 
work of a “crisis committee.” Although the Seoul 
development agenda has received much less at-
tention in the world press than the so-called “cur-
rency war” for which Seoul could not find a so-
lution, it demonstrates that the G20 is gradually 
embarking on a broad, long-term agenda. Other 
examples include the G20’s work on food security, 
fossil fuel subsidies, marine environment protec-
tion and anticorruption. Those who want to restrict 
the G20 to a traditional financial-economic agen-
da, already seem to plead in vain. 
A complicating factor for the future of the 
G20 is the persistence of the G8. The G8 did not 
have such a “competitor” during its own evolution. 
As things stand now, the G8 is likely to survive the 
upgrade of the G20 to a leaders’ summit, at least 
for some years. At its summit in Muskoka in June 
2010, it has even found a new life. By keeping the 
group of invitees limited, it returned to basics: an 
informal gathering of a small group of like-minded 
leaders. By focusing on the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) with regard to mothers and 
children and thus endorsing an ongoing UN proc-
ess, including the MDG summit in September 
2010, the G8 tried to enhance its legitimacy. The 
presentation of the Muskoka Accountability Re-
port on development promises served a similar 
goal. Apart from the announced agenda and the 
communiqué, leaders also discussed pressing is-
sues such UN Security Council reform. Notwith-
standing legitimate criticisms about the broken 
promises, the insufficient amounts of new money 
pledged, and the all too positive tone of the ac-
countability report, Muskoka demonstrated the 
usefulness of having world leaders gathering on a 
periodic basis, even in the restricted G8 configu-
ration. Officials also kept on stressing the value of 
having a like-minded group that can make sub-
stantive decisions and statements on delicate po-
litical issues. 
The expected coexistence of G8 and G20 
in the years ahead gives rise to a lively debate 
on a division of labor between the two, which is 
of course likely to affect their respective futures. 
Many observers and practitioners prefer a rather 
strict functional division of labor, and also believe 
this outcome is the most likely. Consistent with the 
Pittsburgh decision, the G20 is then supposed to 
focus on the financial and economic realm. The 
G8 will rather deal with “political issues”, such as 
security and human rights. This approach would 
radically change the identity of the G8, and block 
a future evolution of the G20 analogous to the G8 
summits between 1975 and 2010. 
Thinkable Scenarios
Let us first consider this functional division of labor 
scenario, with the G20 addressing financial and 
economic issues, and the G8 political ones. In that 
case, the G20 would continue to be run by the min-
isters of finance by and large, while foreign affairs 
and other functional ministries would play a larger 
role in the G8 – with leaders coordinating the two. 
One problem with this distinction is that it is hard 
to define the boundaries between the two realms. 
For example, what about development? What we 
saw in 2010, is the G8 summit in Muskoka putting 
forward a few MDGs as its top priority, and the 
G20 Seoul summit ambitiously launching a new 
paradigm on development cooperation. According 
to the division of labor school, this should be seen 
as an anomaly that is to disappear soon. Develop-
ment as such is supposed to move to one of the 
two groupings. If we see development as basically 
an economic issue, then the G20 should adopt it 
and the G8 lose it. Energy is equally hard to cat-
egorize within one of the two boxes. It is hard to 
argue that energy is non-economic. But if it moves 
to the G20, the finance ministers will have to be 
prepared to share their show in an increasing way 
with the ministers of foreign affairs, energy, envi-
ronment and probably others, since energy is a 
multidimensional and strategic issue par excel-
lence. With energy being a key issue on the G20 
agenda, it would become difficult to treat the G20 
as an exclusively financial-economic forum. What 
about climate change? Is this rather an “econom-
ic” or a “political” issue? Some argue that climate 
finance is for the G20, while the rest of the matter 
belongs to the G8, also given the opposition from 
big emerging economies to thoroughly discuss cli-
mate in the G20 parallel to UN climate negotiations. 
If this pattern persists, climate is rather something 
for the G8 (and of course the UN). 
Another problem is the rejection of “duplica-
tion” which is inherent to the functional division 
of labor approach. Suppose that preparedness to 
discuss climate in the G20 increases. What would 
then be wrong with, for example, using the G8 for 
coordination of climate-friendly domestic policies 
among its members – perhaps around relatively 
stronger emission reduction targets, while the G20 
serves as a site to foster mutual understanding 
among old and emerging industrialized countries, 
to give a boost to international technological col-
laboration, and in the end to break the political 
gridlocks? Would this be an example of undesir-
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able duplication with both the G8 and G20 working 
on climate change? In other words, both group-
ings can add value to one and the same issue area, 
by dealing with it from their specific perspectives. 
A variant of this, is that the G8 and G20 do apply 
a kind of division of labor within one and the same 
issue area, for example development. A theoretical 
example could be that at a more operational lev-
el, among other things, the G8 focuses on health, 
while the G20 addresses infrastructure. 
The fundamental problem with the division of 
labor approach along functional lines is that the 
two bodies’ respective identities have in fact noth-
ing to do with a functional distinction. The G8 is a 
small group of more or less like-minded countries. 
Due to the recent rise of non-Western powers, it 
cannot longer claim to be a leading group for glo-
bal governance. To some extent it could do so dur-
ing the Cold War for the Western world, and short-
ly afterwards for the entire world, but now it has 
definitely lost its position as “group hegemony” [3]. 
Through its outreach process towards China, In-
dia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, in particular 
between 2005 and 2009, it tried to maintain this 
role, but this approach has little future anymore 
since the advent of the G20, in which the emerging 
powers have more chances to enjoy genuine co-
ownership of the process. The G8 has not become 
irrelevant, but will have to redefine its role. In a 
more modest way, it can continue to give impulses 
to global governance and existing multilateralism. 
Maybe more than before, it can act as a “lobby” 
for certain views and values as well. But it will be 
rather a “caucus” at the same level as BRICs or 
IBSA than an apex body for global governance. In 
contrast, the G20, as an emerging global concert, 
possesses more potential to play a coordinating 
role in global (economic) governance, provided 
that political standpoints can converge over time. 
Given these very distinctive identities, the notion of 
a functional division of labor makes little sense. 
As a result, a much more pragmatic approach 
will be necessary. In practice, this approach will 
mainly be driven by the leaders themselves. This is 
the most likely outcome. On a case-by-case basis, 
they will decide in which forum which topic has to 
be dealt with. In certain cases, there will be a clear 
division of labor, in others the G8 and G20 will ad-
dress different aspects of the same issue area, 
and in still others, there will be full duplication. The 
leaders are likely to apply a more complex set of 
decision criteria than the simple economic versus 
political distinction. These (probably) unwritten cri-
teria will depend on the G8 and G20’s respective 
comparative advantage. In some cases, the G8 will 
touch upon some of the same issues as the G20, 
just because the G8 wants to convey certain mes-
sages, or wants to be more ambitious and set an 
example with regard to the issues at hand. Who 
could impede the G8 leaders, for example, to dis-
cuss the state of the world economy during their 
summit, or declare that more action is needed to 
tackle harmful international tax competition and 
non-transparent tax havens? Certain issues will 
move to the G20, because there the countries are 
sitting together that matter most on a particular is-
sue, provided that G20 partners are willing to dis-
cuss it. In these cases, dealing with the issue within 
the G20 instead of the G8 is a matter of necessity 
with a view to success. This might for example ex-
plain a shift of the point of gravity for financial and 
economic matters from the G7/8 to the G20. Or 
if the G8 and G20 are to play a role in multilateral 
trade negotiations, in today’s world it makes more 
sense that the G20 takes the lead. More techni-
cal and less contentious issues – for example in 
the realm of energy technology cooperation – can 
relatively easily be sent to the G20, from where a 
larger contribution to certain global public goods 
can be expected. In the long term, this can even 
include forms of cooperation in the security realm, 
where there exist some common understanding 
and willingness to bring the matter within a wider 
forum such as the G20 (think of policies with re-
gard to maritime piracy or terrorism). It is logical, 
to the contrary, that more delicate and contentious 
issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program or human 
rights abuses, will be touched upon rather by the 
G8 or ad hoc mini-lateral fora than the G20. 
From the most optimist point of view, the co-
existence between the G8 and G20 should not 
hamper each other’s development. What is more, 
the co-existence of the fora adds to institutional di-
versity in global governance, and so may increase 
the likelihood of progress (if it does not work in 
one forum, states can try it in the other). This way, 
“messy multilateralism” is not necessarily a bad 
thing. This idea counterbalances the thinkable ad-
vantages of putting as much as possible under the 
G20 umbrella (e.g., economies of scale in diplo-
matic intercourse; more opportunities to address 
linkages between issue areas and even reach 
package deals; the fostering of a common sense 
of global responsibility) with the risk that once the 
G20 as a whole comes into trouble for one rea-
son or another, this has negative repercussions for 
several issues at the same time. 
Based on this pragmatist dynamic, the G20 
agenda is likely to expand in an incremental way, 
also beyond the traditional financial and economic 
sphere. An all too clear-cut functional division of 
labor is unlikely and undesirable. Admittedly, a fast 
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and spectacular agenda-broadening is not to be 
expected; the G20 is not being catapulted to the 
centre of global governance. Therefore, reluctance 
on the part of certain great powers, and some G8 
middle powers (Canada, Japan, Italy) which are still 
very much attached to their smaller grouping, is 
too strong. However, some non-G8 middle powers 
such as Korea, Australia and Turkey have already 
expressed enthusiasm about a more prominent 
role for the G20. In the years ahead, they could 
be the drivers behind the further development and 
deepening of the G20 process. Korea has already 
made a great contribution through its 2010 presi-
dency. 
Conclusion: No Functional  
Division of Labor
In this paper, we highlighted striking parallels be-
tween the G8’ and G20’ historical evolution. Both 
are rooted in processes of intensifying globali-
zation and intervulnerability as well as growing 
multipolarity. In other words, informal groupings 
of major powers appeared to be a favorite an-
swer to financial and economic crises and other 
global challenges. After becoming a leaders’ sum-
mit, the G8 saw its agenda expand and its min-
isterial activity abound. The G20 now seems set 
for a similar future trajectory, and the question is 
whether this process is stoppable at all. In the pa-
per it was argued that differences between the two 
(e.g., the differing degree of like-mindedness and 
size) will not necessarily block an evolution of the 
G20 along the historical lines of the G8. Yet, the 
co-existence of G8 and G20, combined with the 
rather strict functional division of labor many advo-
cate (“the G20 deals with financial-economic and 
the G8 with political questions”), could derail this 
analogous evolution. However, this outcome is less 
probable, since the distinct identities of the G8 and 
G20 have nothing to do with a functional division 
of labor. Leaders have little reason to adopt such 
an artificial role assignment. Therefore, the paper 
has argued that a further, but very incremental ex-
pansion of the G20’s agenda, even beyond the fi-
nancial and economic realm, and a very pragmatic 
but complex division of labor between the two, are 
more likely outcomes. 
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